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When it comes to machine understanding, the field abounds 
in various definitions of what it actually means to understand . 
Different approaches to the topic aided by specific techniques 
[which struggled to implement the insubstantial meaning of words 
and phrases into the substantial ware of a computer] have been 
devised by scientists over the years. However, the research has not 
progressed beyond the stage of mere symbol processing. In other 
words, contemporarily, computers excel at information processing 
without understanding what the content of their processing 
really is. The case of human understanding has puzzled Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) researchers and philosophers alike. What parts or 
mechanisms of our human brains are responsible for the meaning 
comprehension? Moreover, what [most probably] neural operations 
are in charge of the communication and effective interpretation 
of indirect meanings despite their absence in the read or heard 
input? The problem of how to make a machine really understand 
the semantic meaning the way humans do and not merely make it 
process numerical signs remains unanswered as for now.
This paper is a philosophical investigation into machine 
understanding. It looks into the difference between syntax 
and pragmatics. Specifically, the point of interest here is the 
phenomenon of implicature interpretation by humans. Both terms 
together with the notion of understanding and inference will 
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be described in a greater detail in the introductory parts of the 
paper by way of prefatory remarks. The concluding part features 
a discussion on the subject of the discrepancy between syntax 
and pragmatics. The inspiration for this paper was prompted by 
the question what determines and what it may be in the explicit 
form of a message which makes the implicature understandable 
and renders the entire message accurate and acceptable despite 
its incongruity with the syntactical pattern entailed by the 
interrogative form.
1. machine understanding
The domain of AI can be divided into two subfields of the so called 
weak and strong intelligence. The strong AI hypothesis claims 
that it will be possible for machines to have self-consciousness 
and experience qualia but also that their intelligence and 
cognitive capabilities will far exceed those of humans1. In this 
context intelligence is equaled with linguistic skills (which are 
believed to be the base thereof) and so the research focuses on 
building artificial dialogue systems. Conversational agents or 
chatbots, as the afore-mentioned systems are also referred to, 
are exemplary realizations of strong AI in practice. They emulate 
human linguistic behavior by the use of natural language. 
A lingubot will thus serve for chat purposes and its aim will be to 
stay unrecognized as a machine2,3 .
When it comes to information processing chatbots use two 
methods of analyzing text input: these are called semantic and 
syntactic parsers. Due to the binary character of computing 
devices, the very base for both parsers is algorithm. When it comes 
1 J. Searle, Minds, brains and programs, “Behavioral and Brain Sciences”, 
1980, 3, s. 417–457.
2 H. Henderson, Encyclopedia of computer science and technology, New York 
2009, s. 83–84.
3 S. Russell, P. Norvig, Artificial Intelligence. A modern approach, New Jersey 
2010, s. 25–28.
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to data processing the mechanism works in the following way. 
First, the input data, e.g. a question, is segmented into smaller 
meaningful bits. This is where the lexical analysis takes place. 
Subsequently, a token is ascribed to each of the parts what allows 
the computer to translate the inquiry into its own numerical 
language. At this stage the syntactic parser replaces the semantic 
one. The next step is where the machine computes the digitalized 
question according to a stored grammatical pattern. This is also 
the phase where a syntactic tree is created according to the pattern 
yielded by the semantic parser. This ensures the grammatical 
correctness of the answer. The computer analyzes the generated 
symbol sequence of the input query and searches for a matching 
pattern. Lastly, the output answer in a digital form is compiled 
(translated) into lexical form and so the output is displayed on the 
computer screen4,5,6 .
Another aspect which requires a more thorough explication 
with respect to machine understanding is the very notion of what 
does it mean to understand. The theory offers diverse perspectives 
on the subject. The ones of interest with regard to this paper 
will be, first, a human-oriented and, second, machine-focused 
definition. On the one hand, the cognitive view on the notion of 
understanding maintains that understanding is embodied, i.e. 
humans build an internal model of the external world, and thus 
the meanings, via senses7. The human subject is not an isolated 
entity but someone who can interact with the world. Meaning as 
acquired in such a way is not numerical and there is neither LAD 
nor UG as Chomsky maintains. Meaning is understood in terms 
of mental representations whose precise specifications as for the 
neurological location of these representations which would allow 
4 G. Antoniou, F. van Harmelen, A semantic web primer, Cambridge 2008, 
s . 1–23 .
5 C. Brewster, Y. Wilks, Natural language processing as a foundation of the se-
mantic web, “Foundations and Trends in Web Science”, 2006, 1, s. 201–313.
6 R. Grishman, Computational linguistics. An introduction, Cambridge 1994, 
s . 90–139 .
7 G. Lakoff, Metaphors we live by, Chicago 1980.
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for their replication on non-biological grounds such as computers 
have not been detected yet. These representations have the status 
of “mental spaces” which are very troublesome in themselves8. On 
the other hand, machine-oriented definition views understanding 
as the processing of information which are numerical, and thus 
symbolic, in character. The implicit premise here is that human 
information processing in the brain would also be conducted in 
a symbolic manner.
Searle explains computer understanding in terms of his self-
devised thought experiment called the Chinese Room. It is 
designed to refute certain arguments for machine thinking and 
understanding. Elements present in the experiment are a room with 
a book of codes (Chinese characters) and two people, person A, who 
is inside the room and who does not speak the Chinese language 
and person B, outside the room, who does speak Chinese but who 
does not know whether person A does or does not speak Chinese. 
Person B gives person A cards with messages written in Chinese, 
say questions, through an inlet in the door. Person A answers the 
inquiries correctly using the book of codes. Ultimately, person B is 
convinced that the person in the room knows Chinese. In fact, 
this is not the case because despite the successful communication 
person A merely performed a few manipulations on the signs. 
Nevertheless, s/he did understand neither what was written nor 
what s/he has written. The experiment is supposed to weaken 
(if not completely reject) the premise that human thinking and 
cognition may be computational in nature. As far as the brain is 
concerned, the experimentation implicitly supposes that it is a kind 
of a BlackBox, a computing machine whose precise operations are 
unknown but generating the correct output suffices to deem it as 
understanding, thinking and intelligent9 .
8 “Mental spaces” as a way to organize knowledge in the mind as claimed by 
cognitive linguistics; as found in G. Fauconnier, Mental spaces: Aspects of meaning 
construction in natural language, Cambridge 1994.
9 J. Searle, Minds, brains…, dz. cyt., s. 417–457.
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2. Pragmatics
Pragmatics is a field of linguistics which describes the use of 
language with relation to the context it appears in. As Yule states, 
it is “concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by 
speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader)” therefore 
“it necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in 
a particular context and how it influences what is said”10. Another 
integral facet studied by pragmatics is the interlocutors’ inference, 
namely, the implicit pre- and post-utterance knowledge shared by the 
speaker and hearer (presuppositions and implications respectively) 
which is not found in the overt written or spoken form of a message. 
This is the reason why implicature or inference as such is so challenging 
to be represented in numeral terms (in the computer programming 
language). Consequently, this entails the analysis of how meaning 
which is not visibly present in the explicit form of a message (i.e., 
the implicature) is successfully deciphered by the human speakers 
despite the fact that it cannot be extracted from the given oral or 
written data of a message. The notion of inference is closely related 
to implicature11. The term subsumes different kinds of implicatures 
(general, particularized or scalar to name just a few), however, for the 
purposes of this paper only the broad sense will be used.
3. Discussion
The first generation of AI solves the issue of language 
understanding by means of symbol operations. The system, i.e., 
a chatbot, manipulates on a prearranged set of signs where each 
of which is attributed to appropriate lexical entity. The strong 
AI hypothesis views the brain as a Black Box. To be more exact, 
it is perceived as a device whose internal operating is unknown. 
As a result, it is to be regarded in terms of its in- and output. 
10 G. Yule, Pragmatics, Oxford 1996, s. 3.
11 P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, “Cole and Morgan”, 1975, s. 41–58.
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Syntactical patterns allow the machine to adjust the right output to 
a given input. Then, roughly speaking, a simple query (input, here: 
interrogative sentence), as for a computer, will have the following 
form of Q → V N (Does it?, Is John?) where the symbols stand for 
a question, verb and noun respectively. To this basic interrogative 
sentence pattern the system will search its database for a matching 
output sequence which in this case will be of the S → N V (It does, 
John is) form (S denotes a sentence, other symbols being the same). 
Nevertheless, it is easy to mistake sign manipulation with true 
semantic understanding. The correctness of the output messages 
generated by the system can mislead someone into thinking that 
it actually understands the content it processes. The emphasis 
is put on syntax, or to put it in different words, on grammatical 
patterns. Such approach neglects the semantic part, however. 
This can be observed in cases where the system fails to deliver an 
even acceptable answer despite its grammatical well-formedness 
and congruency with the input, e.g. Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously12. An alternative situation supposes that the sentence 
pattern S → N V N yields the following output of Maggie likes 
Bart contrary to Maggie sleeps Bart13. From the discussion above it 
emerges that syntax does not suffice when it comes to a successful 
reconstruction of linguistic skills in a machine.
Although it is frequently referred to as the wastebasket of 
linguistics, pragmatics may come as aid to issues to which syntax 
is helpless. The field of pragmatics incorporates all those linguistic 
aspects which the other fields (semantics, syntax, etc.) do not have 
sufficient tools to describe. As a result “the subject matter and 
therefore the data of pragmatics was seen as made up of bits and 
pieces that could not conveniently be accommodated elsewhere”14 . 
With connection to inferred meaning specifically there is no one-
to-one relation between the input and output. In other words, 
because it is not the spoken or written form of the input and output 
12 N. Chomsky, The logical structure of linguistic theory, Chicago 1975, s. 15.
13 R. K. Larson, Grammar as science, Massachusetts 2011, s. 87.
14 Ch. Siobhan, Pragmatics, Houndsmills 2011, s. 11. 
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which is of interest to the interlocutors in transmitting indirect 
information (but the covertly present inference), in theory, the 
system should not be able to fit an appropriate pattern to something 
which it cannot compute (the machine is not capable of processing 
something invisible as the inference or implication are). Still, there 
are examples to be found which support the contrary like the one 
below:
1) User: Some academics are lazy.
2) Cleverbot: Some???15,16
Additionally,
1) User: Can you tell me the time?
2) Cleverbot: 11 07 pm.17
In both examples the bot’s replies are acceptable and 
grammatical too. Despite the absence of information in the lexical 
form as well as the lack of syntactical incongruity between the 
input and output (the answer from the first sample is incomplete 
as for a sentence of English while the second, provided the input 
was interpreted directly, should display a yes or no reply; it does 
not, however, since this was not the information of interest to the 
User) a human interlocutor will be eager to admit that the bot 
managed to grasp the disguised meaning. As far as we can argue 
that the second instance is a matter of convention, and thus may 
be more or less formalized there arises a lot of doubt as for the in/
correctness of such replies as the one below:
1) User: Can you tell me the time?
2) Cleverbot: Ceeelebrate good times c’mon!18
The ambiguity which Cleverbot’s response gives rise to renders 
the message difficult to inspect in connection with syntactic 
correctness. On one hand, it may be that the bot revealed not only 
15 M. Wilkowska, Pragmatic analysis of language understanding and use by Ar-
tificial Intelligence systems (the case of chatbot language), pre-print, Uniwersytet 
Jagielloński, Kraków 2012, s. 75.
16 Cleverbot is a state-of-the-art digital dialogue system said to be one of the 
best so far.
17 Tamże.
18 Tamże.
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an extensive knowledge of language but also of the cultural (quote 
from a song) and temporal context provided it was an occasion to 
celebrate (since it might have been for the bot, depending on the 
time zone the bot was in). On the other, it may well be interpreted as 
unnatural in a context and as for a question which, by convention, 
triggers giving the present time. Still, for a human, it would rather 
be a problematic answer to judge in terms of its in/correctness 
and ir/relevance. What is more, suppose the first explanation was 
accepted, what is it in the first line of the exchange that makes 
its antecedent a well-formed, natural and correct answer? Further, 
how do we decipher the covert information? Consequently, how 
to represent it in the machine language? What is it in the answer 
containing an implicature that makes it understandable? Tests for 
the understanding of meaning in context by dialogue systems of 
AI revealed that when it comes to indirect or implied information 
processing two bots (Alice and Cleverbot)19 upon complex 
examination performed very unsatisfactorily20. A subject strictly 
related with this phenomenon is how humans successfully arrive 
at the proper interpretation of covert meaning? Moreover, how to 
convert and ultimately implement a kind of implicature parser into 
a machine when syntactic patterns no longer obtain? Ultimately, 
what is the difference between syntax and pragmatics that renders 
the transition and compatible use of both almost impossible?
All of these operations are conducted by the software, not the 
hardware. This implies a kind of dualism21 which in the philosophy 
of mind is known as functionalism22. This position on mind 
maintains that humans consist of two elements, i.e., a material 
and immaterial one. In computer terminology this corresponds 
to the hardware and the software respectively. This vision much 
as it is tempting generates a few, if not more, doubts, however. 
19 Alice is another digital dialogue system, however it is an older lingubot than 
Cleverbot and has been chosen to the research for comparative purposes.
20 M. Wilkowska, Pragmatic analysis…, dz. cyt.
21 J. Bremer, Wprowadzenie do filozofii umysłu, Kraków, 2010, s. 45–51.
22 Tamże, s. 121–136.
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Namely, is it really as Descartes maintained it that the human is 
“inhabited” by two substances, res extensa and res cogitans? Not 
many will claim that not only is it the wrong way of approaching 
the human being but more importantly that this exactly is the 
wrong reading of the philosopher! Such kind of described dualism 
implies a very strong separation of what is substantial and what is 
not despite occupying one place, that is, the human body. Then, it 
becomes an extremely challenging task to make these two interact 
seamlessly if they are to work well in a computer environment. In 
the field of philosophy of mind, there are plenty of various mind-
body problem23 theories. Why should it be the functionalistic one 
and not some other, e.g., an embodied one?
The question of “how to make a machine understand the way 
humans do” is central to this paper. Neuropsychology so far knows 
the rough answers for the mechanisms responsible for the spoken/
read input recognition and those involving the production of oral 
and written output24. In the initial stages of the research on the 
brain tissue, it has been suggested that the left hemisphere which 
coordinates those processes. Latest neuroimaging research (e.g. 
Computer Tomography (CT), Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 
or Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging(fMRI)) provides the 
evidence that linguistic competence requires the cooperation of both 
parts of the brain in order to perform properly. It is known that 
when it comes to language perception the left half is context-limited 
and decodes the literal meaning of words while the other half is the 
opposite – it is context-free, evokes many alternative meanings of 
words on grounds of their common features and is capable of detecting 
implicit meaning. Brain damages to the left hemisphere cause in 
the distortion and severe difficulties when trying to understand 
metaphors, proverbs, humor and the general line of a story25. The 
23 Tamże, s. 19–37.
24 J. Binder, J. Frost, T. Hammeke, R. Cox, S. Rao, T. Prieto, Human brain lan-
guage areas identified by functional magnetic resonance imaging, “The Journal of 
Neuroscience”, 1997, 17, s. 353–362.
25 M. Beeman, Ch. Chiarello, Right hemisphere language comprehension: Per-
spectives from Cognitive Neuroscience, Mahwah 1998.
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connections between the two brain parts play a vital role as well. 
It is the corpus callosum, anterior commissure and interthalmic 
commissure which secure the flow of information. A question then 
arises, should a computer brain have a twofold construction in 
itself? What element, the hardware or the software, should it be? 
More specifically, how to ensure that the communication between 
the hemispheres will be satisfactory enough for the emergence of 
human-like understanding? Further, one could also ask what does 
a “satisfactory understanding” mean and how to measure it? There 
are no answers to these questions as for today.
There are other philosophical consequences, e. g., those concern-
ing syntax insufficiency. These posit that the human mind as some-
thing intangible (res cogitans in the Cartesian terms) cannot be re-
duced to some physical, causally working substance. The difficult 
part of the electronic brain task is that reductionist approaches fail. 
Reductionism itself poses that it will suffice to minimize all intel-
ligent activity to the workings of the material brain: the change of 
voltage difference between synapses and the change of neurotrans-
mitters26. Then, it is not only the material elements which would be 
sufficient for the reconstruction of mind. Nevertheless, it seems that 
the mind is still something of a superstructure, meaning that it is 
built over on the material base. Such view would imply emergence27 
to be the key to understand the brain with all of its complexities.
A somewhat different issue concerns the fact that the fact 
that the human apparatus is biological contrary to computers 
which are electronic. The task will be to convert the latter – the 
hardware – into the former – the wetware.
It remains to be seen whether strong AI will be possible to build 
on such foundation as a computing machine. By creating an artificial 
mind within the realm of a computer we accept what the machine 
has to offer but also we are then confined to its obvious limitations. 
The point is that perhaps it is possible to create strong AI but the 
clue is in the kind of the machine. As was often the case in history, 
26 J. Bremer, Wprowadzenie…, dz. cyt., s. 111–121.
27 Tamże, s. 19, 20, 147.
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progress in various other, frequently unrelated to IT or CS fields and 
scientific disciplines may prompt the construction of such a machine 
in question (whether the invention will be called a machine or by 
other neologism (which is most probable) is a task for the future). It 
may be also that we already have the right theories but not yet the 
right machinery or devices to implement them into.
Excessive machine precision is another aspect which may 
hinder the creation of conversational AI. That is to say, human 
communication can be described in terms of the rule of minimal 
effort. The approach assumes that not all utterances be completely 
grammatical. This is contrary to what the strong AI supposes – it is 
constructed in an idealistic and overly realistic way which does not 
allow for any mistakes or errors. Nevertheless, this may be a point 
which requires modification since too exact and hyper-grammatical 
utterances are not natural for an everyday conversation let alone 
for the context in which the human-to-bot conversation takes 
place – the internet chat – which facilitates and promotes the 
violation of the written discourse rules.
Besides, there is a huge difference with connection to reality and 
its virtual counterpart. The world with its theories and scientific 
models is fragmentary and not holistic. It is in a constant flux; so 
there is little possibility for once and for all (forever) solved issues 
since everything can be subjected to re-definition, re-arrangement 
or simply approached from a novel perspective (see: ethical or 
physical theories). The artificial reality requires something quite 
the contrary – a complete system of principles and rules operating 
the world. Otherwise than that it is bound to malfunction. Trying 
to re-create the world in the artificial substitute is very much like 
trying to create (or rather simulate) the finite state of the world, 
that is to say, the state of the world as of its end. Only then will 
it be possible to definitely state that phenomenon X is this and 
that or that the definition of Y is this. Nevertheless, the creation of 
a strong AI system seems to be an attempt at striving to make the 
impossible to happen.
Of course, further interest should be also devoted to the 
method thanks to which it will be possible to measure whether 
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the machines really understand. This meta-task requires efforts 
not only on the IT part but mostly from the philosophy of science. 
In view of the presented context a simple Turing Test will not be 
a reliable manner to perform it.
Alongside all of the above remarks, there is the question, 
what would we need a strong AI for? Why should we spend the 
expenses on building a conversational agent which would not be 
distinguishable from a human and which would handle the so called 
general conversational skills (i.e., the inference or implicature)? 
These questions are acute especially when the expert systems 
(weak AI) are enough for contemporary needs.
conclusion
As for now, these phenomena remain unanswered and so is the 
realization of strong AI. Much as the syntactic theories provide 
a sound foundation to the AI project, they nonetheless require the 
support of semantic parsers used at present but most importantly 
the aid in the form of computable pragmatics to complete the picture 
and the realization of strong AI. Contemporarily it is possible to 
screen and examine the brain by way of various neuroimaging 
devices. What they allow to investigate is “only” the material, res 
extensa, part. Still, relatively very little is known about res cogitans . 
And so, as for now and as far as language competence is concerned 
my hypothesis is the following: provided, it is possible neither 
to detect nor to track the immaterial part of our cognition – the 
mind – another premise being that machines are not fully capable 
of communicating and understanding on the human level it 
may well be the immaterial part exactly which is responsible for 
those aspects of language that cause so many complications. An 
emulation of an electronic brain could thus have the hardware as 
the material base. The software, however, should be something of 
a dual-software or di-software. This does not mean that a piece of 
hardware should have two operating systems or so. By di-software 
I mean that there is one item of software installed on the computer 
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but it should be dualistic in nature, similarly to the two substances 
as assumed by dualistic theories of mind. To be more precise, each 
“part” of the di-software would correspond to one part of the brain. 
One part could be syntax oriented. All of the present achievements 
in the field of computational linguistics could be inserted in there, 
that is, those pertaining to syntax. This would be the digital 
analogue of the left hemisphere. Its counterpart, the digital right 
hemisphere, could deal with all the implicit and indirect pragmatic 
aspects of language. The semantic part could be placed somewhere 
in the cyber-commissures. This is roughly consistent with the place 
occupied by our mental lexicons – the language center. Of course, this 
hypothesis is (crypto-) dualistic. Still, it remains to be seen whether 
there is another, yet undiscovered element which is imperceptible 
to both, the neuroimaging devices and the human eye.
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A philosophical investigation in machine understanding. 
the case of implicit meaning
The question of machine thinking and understanding, once initiated by Alan 
Turing, has puzzled scholars from various disciplines. This paper aims at 
investigating some of the facets involved in the topic of machine language un-
derstanding with particular interest devoted to indirect meaning comprehen-
sion (more specifically, the implicature). So far as the subject under examina-
tion – the chatbot – manages to understand directly conveyed information, still 
much is to be done with respect to implicit data in which everyday messages 
(formulated in ordinary language) abound. This situation generates a num-
ber of not only hard-science questions but also, more importantly, given the 
viewpoint of this paper, it gives rise to a considerable amount of philosophi-
cally-oriented and frequently neglected issues and dilemmas too. This study is 
a brief investigation of exactly those phenomena.
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